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THE UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY RIGHTS AT DEATH ACT
INTRODUCTION
Today, eight of the United States' use community prop-
erty systems 2 instead of the common law systems used in the
other 42 states. Because the community property system is
totally alien to common law states which do not recognize com-
munity interests in property, when domiciliaries of a com-
munity property state migrate to a common law state3 prob-
lems develop over the definition of property rights.' Two ques-
I Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Wash-
ington.
I See generally Lay, A Survey of Community Property, 51 IOWA L. Rxv. 625 (1966).
3 This comment will not deal with the reverse problem that occurs when the
change in domicile is from a common law state to a community property state. For an
examination of how California has dealt with this problem see CAL. PROBATE CODE §
201.5 (Supp. 1976); Comment, Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws: The Consti-
tutionality of the "Quasi-Community Property" Legislation, 54 CAL. L. REv. 252
(1966); and De Funiak, Conflict of Laws in the Comunity Property Field, 7 AIZ. L.
REV. 50 (1965).
Most of the literature on this problem has been written by Norvie L. Lay,
Associate Dean at the University of Louisville School of Law. For articles dealing with
various aspects of the migration problem, see the following by Lay: Community Prop-
erty: Its Origin and Importance to the Common Law Attorney, 5 J. FAM. L. 51 (1965);
A Survey of Community Property, 51 IowA L. REv. 625 (1966); Transmutation of
Community Property, 18 S.C.L. Rxv. 755 (1966); Property Rights Following Migration
from a Community Property State, 19 ALA. L. Rav. 298 (1967); Marital Property Rights
of the Non-Native in a Community Property State, 18 HASTINOS L. J. 295 (1967);
Community Property and the Kentucky Attorney, 31 Ky. ST. B.J. 53 (No. 3, 1967);
Community Property in Common Law States: A Comparative Analysis of Its Treat-
ment in Foreign Jurisdictions, 41 TEMP. L. Q. 1 (1967); Retirement Income Credit and
Community Property: A Problem of Vesting, 42 TUL. L. Rgv. 304 (1968); Tax Aspects
of Estate Planning for the Migrant Client from a Community Property State, 35 TENN.
L. REv. 262 (1968); Migrants from Community Property States-Filling the Legislative
Gap, 53 CORNELL L. Rav. 832 (1968); Community Property Problems of the Migrant
Client, U. MIAMI, 3RD INST. ON EST. PLAN. Ch. 69-21 (1969); Community Property
and the Migrant Executive-The Need for Legislation, 108 TRusTS AND EST. 1043
(1969); The Recognition of Community Property in the Common Law Provinces, 34
SASK. L. Rav. 264 (1969); The Role of the Matrimonial Domicile in Marital Property
Rights, 4 FAM. L.Q. 61 (1970); Coping with the Special Tax Problems of the Migrant
Client with Community Property, 33 J. TAx. 264 (1970); Estate Planning Considera-
tions Involved with Community Property and the Migrant Client, 11 J. FAM. L. 255
(1971); Community Property in the Common Law Provinces: The Possible Need for
Statutory Relief, 19 CHrrrv's L.J. 152 (1971); and Community Property and Estate
Planning in a Common Law State, 9 LAw NOTES 13 (1972). See also Bartke,
Community Property Law Reform in the United States and in Canada: A Comparison
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tions usually arise: do the spouses' rights and interests in the
community property change if they move to a common law
state? And if not, how are these rights and interests protected?5
The first question clearly has been answered in the negative.'
The answer to the second question is in doubt, however, be-
cause the common law states have developed no consistent
pattern for dealing with the disposition of estates which include
both the separate property of each spouse and community
property or property traceable to community property.7
To remedy this confusion, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved and recom-
mended for enactment the Uniform Disposition of Community
and Critique, 50 TUL. L. REv. 213 (1976); LeFlar, From Community to Common Law
State, 99 TRusTs & EST. 882 (1960); Wiley, Community Property in a Common Law
State, 21 PRAc. L. 81 (April 15, 1975).
1 Interview with Norvie L. Lay, Associate Dean at the University of Louisville
School of Law, in Louisville, Kentucky September 16, 1976 [hereinafter cited as Inter-
view with Lay].
I See text accompanying notes 11 through 25 infra, particularly notes 21, 22. See
also W. DE FUNLAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF CoMMUNITY PROPERTY § 91 (2d ed.
1971):
It is well settled in this country that a change of domicile does not affect the
nature of property which had already been acquired by the spouses at the
time of the change of domicile. Thus, property which is separate property
under the law of the noncommunity property state under which it was ac-
quired remains separate property when the spouses move to a community
property state, whatever may be the situation as to the nature of property
acquired by them thereafter in the community property state; likewise, com-
munity property according to the law of the community property state in
which it was acquired will be recognized as the property of both spouses in
a noncommunity property state to which they thereafter remove, and though
the title may be in the name of only one of the spouses, the courts will
effectuate the equal ownership by evoking the "trust" theory. The foregoing
is true even though the form of the property is changed after it is brought to
the new domicile.
See also Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 404 (1967).
UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY RIGHTS AT DEATH ACT, 8 UNFORm
LAWS ANNOTATED, ESTATE, PROBATE AND RELATED LAWS 61 (Master Edition 1972)
[hereinafter cited as UNIFORM DISPOSITION ACT], Prefatory Note. The lack of a depend-
able pattern for dealing with this issue in common law states is a result of two factors.
First, the question of how property rights are defined after spouses migrate to a com-
mon law state is often not recognized as a problem area. Second, if the issue is recog-
nized by the parties involved, it is often ignored and all the property is treated as if it
were acquired in the common law state which is the new domicile. Consequently, the
question of how these rights are defined and protected is infrequently litigated and is
not widely enough recognized to be dealt with on a statutory basis. Interview with Lay.
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Property Rights at Death Act in 1971.8 Kentucky adopted this
uniform act in 1974.1 It provides a clear, statutory method for
dealing with the disposition of estates in Kentucky which con-
sist of both separate property and property acquired as com-
munity property under the laws of another state.'0
I. COURTS' APPROACHES IN THE ABSENCE OF THE ACT
The property rights of migrants from a community prop-
erty state to a common law state have always been held enti-
tled to protection," either by constitutional principles or more
frequently by conflict of laws principles. 2 The California Su-
preme Court has held specifically that any disturbance of
vested property rights 3 based solely on a change of domicile
8 UNIFoRM DisPosmoN ACr. Norvie L. Lay, Associate Dean at the University of
Louisville Law School was instrumental in the development of this uniform act. As a
starting point, the commissioners used Lay's suggested statutory provisions in Lay,
Migrants from Community Property States-Filling the Legislative Gap, 53 CORNELL
L. REv. 832 (1968). Lay worked closely with the commissioners throughout the drafting
and approval stages of the Act and provided them with the expertise he gained re-
searching his series of articles, supra note 4. It is largely due to his lobbying efforts
that Kentucky is currently in the vanguard as one of only five states to have adopted
the Act soon after its recommendation in 1971.
1 Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 391.210 to .260 (Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
Kentucky is currently one of only five states to have adopted this act. The other four
states are Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-20-101,-11 (1973); Hawaii, HAw. REv.
STAT. §§ 510-21,-30 (Supp. 1975); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. §§ 112.705-775 (1973); and
Michigan, MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 557.261-.271 (Supp. 1976).
'1 The Act has a very limited scope. It defines only "dispositive rights, at death,
of a married person as to his interests at death in property 'subject to the Act' and is
limited to real property, located in the enacting state and to personal property of a
person domiciled in the enacting state." UNIFORM DISPoSMON Aar, Prefatory Note.
The Act was drafted with such a limited scope to promote wide acceptance among
the common law states. Interview with Lay.
" See Doss v. Campbell, 54 Am. Dec. 198 (Ala. 1851); Quintana v. Ordono, 195
So. 2d 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Wallack v. Wallack, 88 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. 1955);
Beard's Ex'r v. Basye, 46 Ky. 133 (1846); and Depas v. Mayo, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (Mo.
1848).
But cf. Succession of Packwood, 41 Am. Dec. 341 (La. 1845) and Wyatt v. Fulrath,
211 N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965), discussed in text accompanying notes 89 to
94 infra.
2" See text accompanying notes 21 through 25 infra, particularly notes 21, 22.
2 Interests in community property were not always characterized as vested inter-
ests. See Bartke, Community Property Law Reform in the United States and in
Canada-A Comparison and Critique, 50 TuL. L. REv. 213, 219-21 (1976). But today,
all eight community property states do characterize these interests as vested. For
Arizona, see LaTourette v. LaTourette, 137 P. 426, 429 (Ariz. 1914) and Lyons,
1976]
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violates the federal constitution." In In re Thornton's Estate, 15
the court construed a statute which provided in part that per-
sonalty (except separate personalty) 1 acquired by spouses
while domiciled outside California would devolve as com-
munity property under the statutes of succession in California
if the spouses died domiciled in California," so that the change
in domicile alone would convert what was acquired as separate
or joint property in a common law jurisdiction into community
property in the community property jurisdiction."8 Finding this
Development of Community Property Law in Arizona, 1 5 LA. L. REv. 512, 517 (1955);
for California, see CAL. CiV. CODE § 5105 (Supp. 1976) (community interests are
"present, existing and equal"); for Idaho, see Kohny v. Dunbar, 121 P. 544, 546 (Idaho
1912); for Louisiana, see Messersmith v. Messersmith, 86 So. 2d 169 (La. 1956) and
Comment, Nature of the Wife's Interest During the Existence of the Community, 25
LA. L. REV. 159 (1964); for Nevada, see NEV. REv. STAT. § 123.225(1) (1975) (com-
munity interests are "present, existing and equal"); for New Mexico, see N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 29-1-9 (Supp. 1975); for Texas, see Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Still, 163 S.W.2d
268, 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) (the wife's interest in community property is "that of
real ownership, equal to that of the husband") and TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (1975);
and for Washington, see In re Coffey's Estate, 81 P.2d 283, 284 (Wash. 1938) and cases
cited therein.
"1 See also De Funiak, Conflict of Laws in the Community Property Field, 7 Amiz.
L. REV. 50, 51 (1966): "[O]f course, once these [property] rights are fixed, they
cannot be constitutionally changed during the lifetime of the owner merely by moving
the personalty across one or more state lines, regardless of whether there is or is not a
change of domiciles." (emphasis added).
' 33 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1934); Annot., 92 A.L.R. 1343 (1934).
"Separate personalty" in this case included personalty acquired before cover-
ture and personalty acquired after converture by gift, devise, or descent, with all the
rents, issues and profits thereof.
11 Although this case deals with the reverse situation (where the migration was
from a common law state to a community property state) it can be inferred that the
principle that any disturbance in vested property rights solely because of a change of
domicile is unconstitutional would apply as well to the situation where the spouses
migrate into a common law state. The court hints at the wider applicability of their
decision when they state that, "to take the property of A and transfer it to B because
of his citizenship and domicile . . . [is to deny due process of law]. This is true
regardless of the place of acquisition or the state of his residence." 33 P.2d at 3.
S While the result of this law seems strikingly unfair, it has a legitimate theory
behind it. If a married couple acquires all of its property in a common law state, it
remains separate property when the couple moves to a community property state. If
the husband takes title to the property in his name in the community property state,
it remains classified as his separate property. As the community property jurisdictions
recognize no dower, curtesy, or elective share rights (T. A'rWSON, LAw OF WIS § 15
at 64 (2d ed. 1953) ), the wife is left without protection. On the husband's death,
property classified as his separate property can either be freely willed away or will
devolve by statute to his children. The widow is disfranchised-she has neither the
protection of her half of community property nor any dower or forced share rights. The
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statute to be both an abridgement of citizens' privileges and
immunities and a deprivation of property without due process
of law, the court declared the statute unconstitutional. 9
The proposition that property rights are not altered by a
change of domicile because of constitutional restrictions was
mentioned by the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws in
their prefatory note to the Uniform Disposition of Community
Property Rights at Death Act.2 Yet an equally sound basis on
which to find that property rights remain unaltered by a
change in domicile is conflict of laws principles. Both the Re-
statement2' and other commentators 2 specifically take the pos-
idea behind this statute was to grant her some community rights in property acquired
in a common law state and thus provide her with some protection at her husband's
death.
See generally Comment, Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws, supra note 3.
" California has since resolved the constitutional objections to their so-called
"quasi-community property" law. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.5 (Supp. 1976) and
articles cited supra note 3.
While the Thornton decision is still the law in California, a later decision of the
court has called it into question. In Addison v. Addison, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr.
47 (1965), the court upheld a quasi-community property statute on the grounds that
the statute was not activated merely when a spouse changed his domicile to California
but only when a divorce or separate maintenance action was filed. Thus, as a state
has a legitimate interest in domestic relations and enforcement of marital responsibil-
ity, this statute was found not to take property without due process of law nor to
abridge privileges and immunities. While the court was careful to distinguish this
latter statute, which is activated by divorce, from the statute voided in Thornton
which was activated solely by a change of domicile, the court also stated that, "[Tlhe
correctness of the rule of Thornton is open to challenge." 399 P.2d at 901, 43 Cal. Rptr.
at 101.
" The commissioners state that, "As a matter of policy, and probably as a matter
of constitutional law, the move should not be deemed (in and of itself) to deprive the
spouses of any preexisting property rights." UNIFORM DsPosrroN Aar, Prefatory Note.
2! RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 259 (1971) states that:
A marital property interest in a chattel, or right embodied in a docu-
ment, which has been acquired by either or both of the spouses, is not
affected by the mere removal of the chattel or document to a second state,
whether or not this removal is accompanied by a change of domicil to the
other state on the part of one or both of the spouses. The interest, however,
may be affected by dealings with the chattel or document in the second state.
Comment: a. Rationale. Considerations of fairness and convenience
requird that the spouses' marital property interests in a chattel or right
embodied in a document should not be affected by the mere removal of the
chattel or document to another state. Likewise these interests are not af-
fected by a change of domicil to another state by one or both of the spouses.
Similarly, an interest in a right not embodied in a document that was ac-
quired by either or both of the spouses during the marriage is not affected
1976]
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ition that a change in domicile will not alter preexisting prop-
erty rights. Moreover, the majority of courts which found that
property rights were not altered by a migration did so on con-
flicts principles. 3 For example in Wallack v. Wallack, 2 the
husband and wife were married from 1940 to 1950 during which
time they were domiciled in Texas, a community property
state. After a divorce in 1950 the parties moved to Georgia, a
common law state. When the wife demanded an accounting of
all their property, the husband contended their property rights
were defined by Georgia law. The court found that Texas law
controlled in this case, however, and stated that: "In an action
in the courts of this state involving property acquired by the
wife while domiciled in another state, her title or interest
therein will be determined by the laws of such foreign state,
where such laws are properly pleaded and proven."
25
Thus, whether the authority relied on is the federal consti-
tution or conflict of laws principles, the property rights of the
spouses are not altered by their change of domicile and their
interests are protected in the new jurisdiction. Although it is
clear that the spouses' property interests are entitled to protec-
tion by the law, the implementation of the protection is uncer-
tain. Courts facing the responsibility of providing protection for
the property interests of an aggrieved spouse 2 usually choose
by a subsequent change of domicil to another state by one or both of the
spouses (emphasis added).
2 R. LEFLAR, AMEmCAN CoNLCTS LAw § 236 (Student Ed. 1968) states that: "It
is quite clear that marital titles in the goods do not change by reason of the removals,
either where separate property has been taken into a community state, or where com-
munity property has been taken into a common-law state [footnotes omitted]."See
also W. DE FuNIwr & M. VAUGHN, PRNcipLS oF CommmuNIr PnoPERTY § 201.1 at 463
(2d ed. 1971):
[U]nder principles of. . . conflict of laws . . . when property is removed
from one jurisdiction to another it retains the same character or nature that
it had before its removal, and . . . this is true even where it is, after its
removal, converted to some other form. Thus, property which has acquired
the character or nature of separate or community property at the time of its
acquisition, according to the law governing at that time, still retains its same
character or nature as separate community property when removed to
another jurisdiction (footnote omitted).
23 Doss v. Campbell, 54 Am. Dec. 198 (Ala. 1851); Quintana v. Ordono, 195 So.
2d 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Depas v. Mayo, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (Mo. 1848).
11 88 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. 1955).
" Id. at 156.
2' See, e.g., Quintana v. Ordono, 195 So. 2d 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Beard's
Ex'r v. Basye, 46 Ky. 133 (1846); Depas v. Mayo, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (Mo. 1848); Rozan
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the device of a resulting2 or constructive trust.2 For example,
if a husband and wife moved from a community property state
to a common law state, purchased a home with community
funds, and the husband took title in his name alone, the title
holder-husband would be deemed a constructive trustee of one-
half of the property for the benefit of the wife. The first court
to apply this remedy to an analogous fact pattern was the
Kentucky Court of Appeals. In Beard's Executor v. Basye,29 the
spouses were married in Louisiana where the wife had a large
estate including several slaves who were classified as the wife's
separate property"0 by Louisiana law. One year after they were
married, the spouses moved to Kentucky, and three years later
the wife sued for divorce and restoration of her property. 1 The
v. Rozan, 129 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1964); and Edwards v. Edwards, 233 P. 477 (Okla.
1925).
2 Broadly speaking, a resulting trust arises from the nature or circum-
stances of consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person
thereby becomes invested with a legal title but is obligated in equity to hold
his legal title for the benefit of another, the intention of the former to hold
in trust for the latter being implied or presumed as a matter of law, although
no intention to create or hold in trust has been manifested, expressly or by
inference, and although there is an absence of fraud or constructive fraud.
Indeed, there is usually no element of fraud in a resulting trust, and the
presence of fraud makes the trust a constructive one.
76 AM. JuR. 2d Trusts § 196 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
2 A constructive trust is defined as:
A trust by operation of law which arises contrary to intention and in invitum,
against one who, by fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse of
confidence, by commission of wrong, or by any form of unconscionable con-
duct, artifice, concealment, or questionable means, or who is any way against
equity and good conscience, either as obtained or holds the legal right to
property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy
[footnote omitted]. It is raised by equity to satisfy the demands of justice.
76 AM. JuR. 2d Trusts § 221 (1975). See also Moses v. Moses, 53 A.2d 805, 808 (N.J.
Ct. Err. & App. 1947) (citation omitted):
In general, a constructive trust arises where a person holding title to property
is under an equitable duty to convey it to another because he would be
unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it. There may be a construc-
tive trust where the retention of the property would unjustly enrich the
person retaining it, even though its acquisition was not wrongful. The en-
forcement of such a trust consists merely in the restoration of the status quo.
46 Ky. 133 (1846).
Although this case deals with protecting the wife's separate property as opposed
to protecting her interests in the community property, the theory of the constructive
trust would operate similarly in either case.
11 when the spouses in this case moved to Kentucky in 1826, Kentucky did not
19761
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Court held that the property remained the wife's notwithstand-
ing the move" and that the husband took only legal title as
trustee for the benefit of the wife.
3
The remedy of a constructive trust was applied again in
Depas v. Mayo.34 The spouses were married in Pennsylvania
but moved immediately to Louisiana. Here they acquired sub-
stantial property, all of which was classified as community
property by Louisiana law. Several years later the couple
moved temporarily to Missouri, a common law state, where
they bought some realty, the husband taking title in his name
alone. They then moved back to Louisiana keeping title to the
realty. The wife subsequently sued for divorce, and the hus-
band began to dispose of all his property, including the Mis-
souri land, to avoid alimony. The wife brought suit asking that
one-half the land in Missouri be made hers by constructive
trust. The court found that the wife had a vested interest under
Louisiana law, and that the migration to Missouri did not af-
fect this interest.35 The court stated that the law in Missouri
permit married women to own property. The law was that at marriage, all the wife's
property became the property of the husband. Thus when the wife in this case sued
for "restoration of her property," the Court was concerned only with the property she
owned in Louisiana and which by Louisiana law remained her separate property.
32 The Court refused to determine that:
[B]y the removal to Kentucky of a husband and wife with property which
belonged to the wife at the place of their marriage and former residence, and
until they entered Kentucky, the property became at once, either in virtue
of her consent to the change of domicil, however obtained, or in virtue of the
actual change, whether with or without her consent, absolutely lost to her,
and absolutely transferred to her husband.
46 Ky. at 143.
13 The Court stated:
But if it were necessary for the preservation of the interest which they [the
laws of Louisiana] undoubtedly reserve to the wife, it might not be doing
violence to them to consider them as making the husband, in fact, a trustee.
[A]t most, our law operated to invest the husband with the legal
title and use, until separation, or until the dissolution of the marriage by his
death, when it reverted to the wife, except as to such property as he may
have sold to a bona fide purchaser, not having notice of her title; and that
as Bayse purchased the slaves with a knowledge of her claim, she had a right
to recover them from him in the action of detinue.
Id. at 147-48.
3, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (Mo. 1848).
3 Id. at 91:
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was that "if A. purchases land with the money of B. and takes
the legal title to himself, a court of equity will regard him as a
trustee. ... 3 Thus a constructive trust was used to protect
the wife's interest.
In a more recent case, 37 the Supreme Court of Florida
reached a similar conclusion. The husband and wife were domi-
ciliaries of Cuba, a community property country. In 1952 and
1958, the husband purchased stock in companies in the United
States; in 1960, the couple moved to Florida, a common law
state and in 1963, the husband sold the stock for a promissory
note worth $810,000. When he died later that year, the question
arose whether the wife had any rights in the $810,000. The
court stated that the law of the parties' domicile at the time of
acquisition of personal property controls to define the interests
taken therein,3 and a subsequent change in domicile does not
alter these interests.39 Thus the stock was classified as com-
munity property, since it was acquired while the spouses were
domiciled in Cuba. As the promissory note was directly trace-
able to the stock, it was also classified as community property,
although title was in the husband's name alone. The court was
clear on the remedy applicable to this situation:
Under Florida Law, if a portion of the consideration belongs
to the wife and title is taken in the husband's name alone, a
resulting trust arises in her favor by implication of law to the
extent that consideration furnished by her is used. A result-
ing trust is generally found to exist in transactions affecting
The removal of Depas and his wife from Louisiana to this state [Missouri]
does not alter the character of this transaction. Had Depas, whilst residing
in Louisiana, remitted a sum of money, belonging to the community, and
procurred its investment in Missouri lands, would the rights of the parties
in Louisiana have been changed? What difference can it make, that previous
to the investment the parties had changed their domicile?
39 Id.
u Quintana v. Ordono, 195 So. 2d 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
" Id. at 579:
Whether the source of the purchase price of the stock was from enterprises
within Cuba or Florida is not material. What is material and not in conflict
is that the husband and wife were domiciled in Cuba at the time of the
acquisition of the stock.
See also note 65 infra and accompanying text.
3* "The interest which vested in the wife was not affected by the subsequent
change of domicile from Cuba to Florida in 1960." 195 So. 2d at 588 (footnote omitted).
19761
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community property in noncommunity property states where
a husband buys property in his own name. Therefore, while
the husband held legal title to the note and contract, he held
a one-half interest in trust for his wife.
40
While other courts have also used the constructive trust
remedy,4" its main disadvantage is that it forces the aggrieved
spouse into court battles over applicable law in order to get
protection for his or her property interests. In contrast, under
the Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at
Death Act, the spouses' dispositive rights at death are codified
and clearly defined. Thus court battles are avoided and inter-
ests are protected automatically.
42
II. STRUCTURE AND ANALYsIS OF THE ACT
The Uniform Disposition of Community Property Rights at
Death Act as enacted in Kentucky consists of 11 statutes of
which the first 3 are the most important.43 The first statute,4
entitled "Application," defines property which is subject to the
Act.45 This includes (1) personal property wherever situated
"0 Id. (footnotes omitted).
" Rozan v. Rozan, 129 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1964); Edwards v. Edwards, 233 P. 477
(Okla. 1924).
42 Interview with Lay.
4 In the Prefatory Note to the UNIFORM DISPOSION AcT, the Commissioners de-
scribe the first three statutes as "the heart of the Act."
" KRS § 391.210 (Supp. 1976) provides as follows:
Application. -KRS 391.210 to 391.260 applies to the disposition at death of
the following property acquired by a married person:
(1) All personal property, wherever situated:
(a) Which was acquired as or became, and remained, community property
under the laws of another jurisdiction; or
(b) All or the proportionate part of that property acquired with the rents,
issues, or income of, or the proceeds from, or in exchange for, that com-
munity property; or
(c) Traceable to that community property;
(2) All of the proportionate part of any real property situated in this state
which was acquired with the rents, issues or income of, the proceeds from,
or in exchange for, property acquired as or which became, and remained,
community property under the laws of another jurisdiction, or property
traceable to that community property.
,' The UNIFORM DIsPosrrION AcT does not introduce the system of community
property into Kentucky. On the contrary, the Act was very carefully drafted to avoid
calling property in Kentucky "community property." Instead it is referred to in the
statute as "property to which KRS 391.210 to 391.260 applies." See, e.g., KRS §
391.225 (Supp. 1976) reprinted infra note 56.Interview with Lay.
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which was acquired as or became community property under
the laws of another jurisdiction, and (2) real property located
in Kentucky which was acquired in exchange for property de-
fined as community property. Both subsection (1), which deals
with personal property, and subsection (2), which deals with
real property, incorporate the concepts of tracing and appor-
tionment. Thus if property is traceable to a community source,
absent a voluntary severance" by the parties, the property is
subject to the Act regardless of the form in which it is held. As
for apportionment, the Act applies only to "all or the propor-
tionate part"4' of property traceable to what would be com-
munity property under the laws of another jurisdiction. Thus
if a husband and wife move from California to Kentucky and
purchase a lot in Kentucky, paying 75 percent of the price with
community funds and 25 percent of the price with funds classi-
fied as the wife's separate property, the Act will apply to only
75 percent of the real property; the other 25 percent will not
qualify."
The second statute" establishes two rebuttable presump-
" The parties are free to execute a knowing and voluntary severance of their
community rights in the property and to choose how the property will be held. The
difficult issue is whether a severance of community interests will be implied if the
parties take title as joint tenants with right of survivorship. See discussion in text
accompanying notes 87 through 94 infra.
' KRS § 391.210 (1) (b) and (2) (Supp. 1976).
" The Commissioners describe this apportionment requirement as a policy deci-
sion:
To put it succinctly, the phrase ["all or the proportionate part"] represents
a condensation of an area covered by many pages in a prior draft and is
simply a statement of policy; it leaves to the courts the difficult task of
working out the precise interest which will be treated as the "proportionate
part" of the property subject to the dispositive formula of Section 3.
UNIFORM DisPosrrioN AcT, Commissioners' Note to § 1.
4 KRS § 391.215 (Supp. 1976) provides:
Rebuttable presumptions.-In determining whether KRS 391.210 to 391.260
applies to specific property the following rebuttable presumptions apply:
(1) Property acquired during marriage by a spouse of that marriage while
domiciled in a jurisdiction under whose laws property could then be acquired
as community property is presumed to have been acquired as or to have
become, and remained, property to which KRS 391.210 to 391.260 applies;
and
(2) Real property situated in this commonwealth and personal property
wherever situated acquired by a married person while domiciled in a jurisdic-
tion under whose laws property could not then be acquired as community
property, title to which was taken in a form which created rights of survivor-
1976]
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tions "to assist a court in applying the definitions in Section
1, through a process of tracing the property to a community
property origin."" Subsection (1) provides that property ac-
quired during marriage in a community property jurisdiction
is presumed to have become and remained property subject to
this Act. Subsection (2) states that real property in this state
and personal property wherever situated acquired by a married
person while domiciled in a common law state, title to which
was taken in a form creating rights of survivorship, is presumed
not to be property to which the Act applies. These presump-
tions are for procedural convenience only and will not affect the
spouses' actual interests in the property;5 furthermore, they
can be rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
The third statute,' 2 entitled "Disposition upon Death" is
the main operative section of the Act. It provides that on the
death of a married person, one-half of the property to which the
Act applies is the property of the surviving spouse 3 and is not
subject to testamentary disposition by the decedent or distri-
bution under the laws of intestate succession. The other one-
half of the property subject to the Act is the property of the
decedent to dispose of as he chooses. The final sentence of this
statute provides that the one-half of the property that is the
decedent's is not subject to the surviving spouse's right to elect
against the will. 4
ship, is presumed not to be property to which KRS 391.210 to 391.260 ap-
plies.
"UNIFORM DIsPosrnoN ACT, Commissioners' Note to § 2.
Id.
52 KRS § 391.220 (Supp. 1976) provides:
Disposition upon death.-Upon death of a married person, one-half (1/2) of
the property to which KRS 391.210 to 391.260 applies is the property of the
surviving spouse and is not subject to testamentary disposition by the dece-
dent or distribution under the laws of succession of this commonwealth. One-
half (1/2) of that property is the property of the decedent and is subject to
testamentary disposition or distribution under the laws of succession of this
commonwealth. With respect to property to which KRS 391.210 to 391.260
applies, the one-half (1/2) of the property which is the property of the dece-
dent is not subject to the surviving spouse's right to elect against the will.
'3 As is the case in the community property states, at the decedent's death the
property does not "pass" to the surviving spouse; the one-half interest is merely owned
automatically by the surviving spouse. Interview with Lay. This has important tax
consequences. See note 83 infra.
1, KRS § 391.220 (Supp. 1976).
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The final eight parts of the Act are supplementary. As the
commissioners explain, "they might almost be described as
precatory and have been added to clarify situations which
would probably follow from the first three sections but which
might raise questions. 55 These sections provide for perfection
of the title of the surviving spouse,56 perfection of the title of
the personal representative, heir or devisee, 57 protection for
purchasers and lenders taking a security interest for value from
a person who appears to have title to this property, 8 and for
the Act having no effect on creditors' rights.59 The final four
SUNIFoRM DISPOSITION Aar, Prefatory Note.
- KRS § 391.225 (Supp. 1976) provides:
Perfection of title of surviving spouse.-If the title to any property to which
KRS 391.210 to 391.260 applies was held by decedent at the time of death,
title of the surviving spouse may be perfected by an order of the probate
court or by execution of an instrument by the personal representative or the
heirs or devises of the decedent with the approval of the probate court.
Neither the personal representative nor the court in which the decedent's
estate is being administered has a duty to discover or attempt to discover
whether property held by the decedent is property to which KRS 391.210
to 391.260 applies, unless a written demand is made by the surviving spouse
or the spouse's successor in interest.
" KRS § 391.230 (Supp. 1976) provides:
Perfection of title of personal representative, heir, or devisee.-If the title to
any property to which KRS 391.210 to 391.260 applies is held by the surviv-
ing spouse at the time of the decedent's death, the personal representative
or an heir or devisee of the decedent may institute an action to perfect title
to the property. The personal representative has no fiduciary duty to dis-
cover or attempt to discover whether any property held by the surviving
spouse is property to which KRS 391.210 to 391.260 applies, unless a written
demand is made by an heir, devisee, or creditor of the decedent.
" KRS § 391.235 (Supp. 1976) provides:
Purchaser for value or lender.-If a surviving spouse has apparent title to
property to which KRS 391.210 to 391.260 applies, a purchaser for value or
a lender taking a security interest in the property takes his interest in the
property free of any rights of the personal representative or an heir or devisee
of the decedent. If a personal representative or an heir or devisee of the
decedent has apparent title to property to which KRS 391.210 to 391.260
applies, a purchaser for value or a lender taking a security interest in the
property takes his interest in the property free of any rights of the surviving
spouse. A purchaser for value or a lender need not inquire whether a vendor
or borrower acted properly. The proceeds of a sale or creation of a security
interest shall be treated in the same manner as the property transferred to
the purchaser for value or a lender.
", KRS § 391.240 (Supp. 1976) provides: "Creditor's rights.-KRS 391.210 to
391.260 does not affect rights of creditors with respect to property to which KRS
391.210 to 391.260 applies."
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sections provide for the right of married persons to sever their
interests in community property,"0 for limitations on testamen-
tary disposition otherwise imposed by law,61 for uniformity of
application and construction, 2 and finally for the Act's
title. 3
Ill. APPLICATION OF THE ACT
To apply this Act, the attorney must first characterize his
client's assets as separate or community property64 as of the
date the client moved to the common law state, since only
community property is subject to the Act. Property interests in
personalty are defined by the law of the parties' domicile at the
date of acquisition. 5 Property interests in realty are defined at
11 KRS § 391.245 (Supp. 1976) provides: "Acts of married persons.-KRS 391.210
to 391.260 does not prevent married persons from severing or altering their interests
in property to which KRS 391.210 to 391.260 applies."
See also text accompanying notes 87 through 94 infra regarding the parties' right
to sever.
6" KRS § 391.250 (Supp. 1976) provides: "Limitations on testamentary disposi-
tion.-KRS 391.210 to 391.260 does not authorize a person to dispose of property by
will if it is held under limitations imposed by law preventing testamentary disposition
by that person."
62 KRS § 391.255 (Supp. 1976) provides: "Uniformity of application and
construction.-KRS 391.210 to 391.260 shall be so applied and construed as to effec-
tuate the general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of KRS
391.210 to 391.260 among those states which enact it."
63 KRS § 391.260 (Supp. 1976) provides: "Title.-KRS 391.210 to 391.260 may be
cited as the uniform disposition of community property rights at death act."
" The UNIFORM DISPOSITION ACT covers only community property or property
traceable to community property. KRS § 391.210 (Supp. 1976). The decedent's disposi-
tive rights in his separate property are defined in KRS § 394.020 (1972). See also Wiley,
Community Property in a Common Law State, 21 PRAC. LAW. 81, 89 (April 15, 1975).
65 See GOODRICH, CONFL.CT OF LAws § 124 (4th ed. 1964):
Marital rights in movables acquired subsequent to marriage are determined
by the law of the domicile of the parties at the time of acquisition ...
The American cases are quite uniform in applying the law of the domi-
cile at the time the property is acquired, not that of the original matrimonial
domicile nor any intermediate domicile. (footnote omitted).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 258 (1971):
(1) The interest of a spouse in a movable acquired by the other spouse
during the marriage is determined by the local law of the state which, with
respect to the particular issue, has the.most significant relationship to the
spouses and the movable under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the spouses, greater
weight will usually be given to the state whether [sic] the spouses were
[Vol. 65
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acquisiton by the law the courts of the situs would apply.5 'As
was noted earlier, once these interests are defined, there is no
alteration in the interests if the owner merely migrates to a
state with a different property system: the property rights are
fixed unless the parties have voluntarily severed them."7 Thus,
in order to characterize the property as separate or community,
the attorney must determine how it was classified under the
laws of the community property state in which the parties were
formerly domiciled." While all eight of the community prop-
erty states define separate and community property in some-
what analogous ways, 9 there are significant variations and the
law of the specific state should be consulted carefully before
attempting to characterize the property as separate or com-
munity. 0
domiciled at the time the movable was acquired than to any other contact
in determining the state of the applicable law.
Furthermore, Comment (b) to § 258 states that "[Tihe local law of the state
where the spouses were domiciled at the time the movable was acquired will usually
be applied to determine marital property interests therein in the absence of an effective
choice of law by the parties." Id.
" RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) CoNucr oF LAws § 234 (1971) provides:
Effect of Marriage on an Interest in Land Later Acquired.
(1) The effect of marriage upon an interest in land acquired by either of
the spouses during coverture is determined by the law that would be applied
by the courts of the situs.
(2) These courts would usually apply their own local law in determining
such questions.
Comment:
a. The forum will attempt to decide questions as to the effect of marriage
upon an interest in land acquired during coverture in the same way that
these questions would have been decided in the very case at hand by the
court of the situs. These courts would not always decide such questions in
accordance with their own local law. They would usually hold that any
marital property interests which the spouses had in the funds or other prop-
erty exchanged for the land have been transferred to the land itself. So if land
in a common law state is purchased with funds that are held in community
because acquired while the spouses were domiciled in a community property
state (compare § 258), the courts of the situs would usually hold that the
spouses-at least as between themselves- have the same marital property
interests in the land as they formerly had in the funds (emphasis added).
" See text accompanying notes 87 to 94 infra See also KRS § 391.245 (Supp. 1976)
reprinted supra note 60.
0 Interview with Lay; Wiley, Community Property in a Common Law State, 21
Phc. LAw. 81, 90 (April 15, 1975).
See generally Lay, supra note 2.
" Definitions of separate and community property in the community property
states are statutory. See Amz. Rxv. STAT. §§ 25-211, 25-213 (1956); CAL. CONsT. art. 1,
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Once the attorney has consulted the law of the particular
community property state involved and ascertained how his
client's property interests are defined,7' the next problem is
tracing these interests.7 2 The best proof of whether a particular
asset is traceable to a community source is either affidavits or
lists in the client's handwriting,73 but any proof that will estab-
lish the source of the property is acceptable.1
4
If no proof is available, i.e., if the property is so commin-
gled that it is impossible to distinguish the separate from the
community property, a court might take one of three ap-
proaches. First, a court could characterize all the property as
community since in all the community property states, if the
assets are so commingled as to be indistinguishable, there is a
presumption that they are held as community assets. 5 Second,
a court could proceed on an inferred intent theory: viz., that if
the parties are not concerned enough to preserve the corn-
§ 21 (Supp. 1976) renumbering and amending CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 8, (1954); CAL.
CIv. CODE §§ 5107, 5108 (1970), 5110 (Supp. 1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 32-903, 32-906
(1963); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2334 (1971); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 123.130-.220 (1975);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-4A-1 (Supp. 1975); TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (1975); WASH.
REv. CODE §§ 26.16.010-.030. (1976).
71 Of course, the UNIFORM DISPosrrMON Acr applies only to property acquired while
the community is domiciled in the community property state and property traceable
to property acquired while domiciled in the community property state. Property ac-
quired subsequent to the change in domicile is governed by the law of the new domicile,
in this case a common law state.
72 See KRS § 391.210(1)(c) (Supp. 1976), reprinted supra note 44, stating that
property "traceable" to a community source is also covered by the Act. This tracing
of assets is usually the most difficult task involved in applying the Act. Interview with
Lay.
73 Interview with Lay.
74 Id.
11 See in Arizona: Evans v. Evans, 288 P.2d 775 (Ariz. 1955); Franklin v. Franklin,
253 P.2d 337 (Ariz. 1953); and Lawson v. Ridgeway, 233 P.2d 459, 464 (Ariz. 1951); in
California: Austin v. Austin, 11 Cal. Rptr. 593, 595 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); Thomas-
set v. Thomasset, 264 P.2d 626 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954); and Reid v. Reid, 44 P. 564
(Cal. 1896); in Idaho: Vermont Loan & Trust Co. v. McGregor, 51 P. 104 (Idaho 1897);
in Louisiana: Giamanco v. Giamanco, 131 So. 2d 159, 164 (La. Ct. App. 1961); in
Nevada: Ormachea v. Ormachea, 217 P.2d 355, 367 (Nev. 1950); in New Mexico:
Burlingham v. Burlingham, 384 P.2d 699, 705 (N.M. 1963); in Texas: Gifford v. Gab-
bard, 305 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); and in Washington: In re Estate of
Allen, 343 P.2d 867, 870 (Wash. 1959). See also Wiggins v. Rush, 489 P.2d 641 (N.M.
1971) (where parties made no effort to segregate their separate funds from their com-
munity funds, and no accounting was made as to the sources of income, and all moneys
were deposited in a joint account, certain realty acquired after marriage was com-
munity property even though the deeds named the parties as joint tenants).
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munity or separate status of their property, a court may infer
that the property was intentionally taken in the form in which
it is held and that this form accurately reflects the spouses'
respective interests in that property." Finally, a court could
protect the property interests the spouses had when they
entered the state, assuming a breakdown of those interests is
available, with all accretions being governed by the law of the
current domicile." This solution depends on the courts' willing-
ness to examine the parties' assets and distinguish accretions
from previously held assets.
7 8
Once the attorney has categorized all the property as ei-
ther separate or community by the laws of the prior domicile
and dealt with the tracing problems, the parties' dispositive
rights are clearly defined by Kentucky law. The decedent's
separate property and one-half of the property covered by the
Act are subject to the decedent's testamentary disposition79 or
pass under the statutes of descent and distribution. 0 The other
half of the property covered by the Act is owned at the dece-
dent's death by the surviving spouse."1
IV. POSSIBLE INTERPRETIVE QUESTIONS
Although the Act is easily understood and applied, there
are some questions that will undoubtedly arise and be settled
through the interpretation of a court." Three issues are imme-
diately presented.8 3 The first is the effect of the Act on dower
71 Interview with Lay. For example, if the husband takes title to the house in his
name alone and the wife allows this, a court could find that the house is the husband's
separate property regardless of the possibility that the house was bought with com-
munity funds.
" Interview with Lay.
71 Id. Although this approach is one alternative, it will probably be the least likely
to be used by courts because it is based on a breakdown of the married couple's
property at the time of the move from the community property state to the common
law state. As a practical matter, few married couples take time to inventory their
property and catalogue their rights in it when they are moving from one state to
another.
, KRS § 394.020 (1975).
KRS § 391.010 (1975).
" KRS §§ 391.210-.260 (Supp. 1976).
Interview with Lay.
A question which might be presented in the area of state inheritance taxes is
obviated by the UNIFORM DIsPosroN Aar's design. Interview with Lay. Two states
which have not adopted the Act, Montana (In re Hunter's Estate, 236 P.2d 94 (Mont.
19761
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and curtesy rights. As recommended, section 3 of the Act in-
cludes the provision that "[no estate of dower or curtesy exists
in the property of the decedent]." But when Kentucky
adopted the Act, this bracketed language was deleted.84 Pre-
sumably, then, the surviving spouse retains the right of dower
or curtesy. The commissioners recommended against this,
stating that:
Dower and curtesy do not exist in community property and
have been abolished in many common law states; policy con-
sideratons suggest that no such interest should exist in prop-
erty subject to this Act, since the surviving spouse already
has a one-half interest in such property. Similar reasons sug-
gest a denial of any right in the surviving spouse to elect a
statutory share in the one-half of the property over which the
decedent had a power of disposition. 5
As the commissioners state, the better view is that no rights of
dower and curtsey exist in property of the decedent subject to
the Act because the surviving spouse would then be entitled
both to his half of the property subject to the Act and to dower
or curtesy rights in the deceased's half of the property subject
to the Act. This much protection for the surviving spouse is
unwarranted. It is hoped, therefore, that the Kentucky courts
will find that the surviving spouse has no dower or curtesy
interest in this property.
1951) (noted in 27 TuE. L. Rv. 116 (1952)) and Ohio (In re Estate of Kessler 203 N.E.2d
221 (Ohio 1964)) take the position that all community property is taxed upon the death
of the husband, although the wife had present and vested ownership rights in one-half
of that property. This is an illogical and much-criticized view. On the other hand, in
Colorado (People v. Bejarno, 358 P.2d 866 (Col. 1961)) only one-half the community
property is taxed at the husband's death.
The UNIFORM DIsPosrrION AcT is intended to resolve this question and adopts the
Colorado approach through language stating that "at death, one-half the property to
which this Act applies is the property of the surviving spouse. . . ." UNIFORM Disposi-
TION Acr, § 3 (emphasis added). See generally Lay, Tax Aspects of Estate Planning
for the Migrant Client from a Community Property State, 35 TENN. L. R v. 262 (1968).
KRS § 391.220 (Supp. 1976).
UNIFORM DISPOSMON AcT, Commissioners' Note to § 3. Accord, Editors, Choice
of Law in Estates and Trusts, 1969 ILL. L. FORUM 354, 364. See generally Lay, Property
Rights Following Migration from a Community Property State, 19 AiA. L. REv. 298,
351 (1967); Lay, Community Property in Common Law States: A Comparative Analy-
sis of its Treatment in Foreign Jurisdictions, 41 TEMP. L. Q. 1, 22 (1967); LeFlar, From
Community to Common Law State, 99 TRusTs & EsT. 882, 884-85 (1960); LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CONFLIcTs LAW § 236 (2d ed. 1968); Wiley, Community Property in a Com-
mon Law State, 21 PRAc. LAW. 81, 93 (April 15, 1975).
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The second issue presented is how property should be
characterized if it is indistinguishably commingled. Of the
three possible approaches described above, 6 the best approach
is the first one-to characterize all the property as community
property. While this treatment sounds harsh and inflexible, it
has precedent in that it is the method used in all eight com-
munity property states. Additionally, this method avoids the
pitfalls of the second approach (where it is inferred that the
form in which the property is held in the common law state
accurately reflects the spouses' interests) because it does not
depend on any judicial inferences as to the parties' intent. It
is also better than the third approach, because the third ap-
proach would consume too much of the courts' time in distin-
guishing accretions from previously held assets, and at any
rate, the third approach is dependent on the parties' making
an accounting of their respective interests at the time of the
move-an accounting very few couples make as a practical
matter. Thus the first approach provides the fairest, quickest
and most accurate overall solution to the commingled assets
problem.
The third question raised by the Act involves the issue of
severance of interests. This issue presents the question
"whether the court will infer that parties have agreed to a
severance of the community by taking title as joint tenants
with the right of survivorship."' 7 Nothing in the Act precludes
this inference,8 and two cases have used the inference to reach
undesirable results. In Succession of Packwood,"9 the spouses
lived in Louisiana from 1804 until 1836, when they moved to
New York. They held a plantation in Louisiana as community
property where sugar was grown and sold. Mr. Packwood took
the proceeds from the sale of sugar and put them in a bank
account in his name in New York. The court held implicitly
11 See text accompanying notes 75 through 78 supra.
87 Interview with Lay.
I The rebuttable presumption of KRS § 391.215(2), reprinted supra note 49,
applies only to property acquired while the couple was domiciled in a common law
state. Thus if property were acquired in a community property state and then, when
the spouses migrated, put in the form of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, the
court would be free to draw its own inferences in the absence of an express agreement
between spouses.
1' 41 Am. Dec. 341 (La. 1845).
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that the change in the form of the property changed the inter-
ests involved-that there was an implied severence of the com-
munity interests and all the property then became the
husband's.g°
In Wyatt v. Fulrath9' the court reached a similar conclu-
sion. The Duke and Duchess of Arion were domiciliaries and
nationals of Spain, a community property country. Due to pol-
itical instability in Spain, they put their money in a bank
account in New York but never left Spain. In establishing or
continuing these accounts, the spouses "either expressly agreed
in writing that the New York law of survivorship would apply
or agreed to a written form of survivorship account conformable
to New York law. 9 2 The Duke died in 1957, and the Duchess
took control of the money and disposed of it in her will when
she died in 1959. The Duke's administrator demanded an ac-
counting. The issue was whether the law of Spain (the domicile
at acquisition) should be applied to the property in New York,
in which event only half of the property should have gone to
the Duchess, or whether the law of New York should control,
in which event all the property was the Duchess's as survivor.
The survivorship agreement was void by Spanish law. The New
York Court of Appeals, in a four to three decision, held that
New York law governed and that all the property belonged to
the Duchess. Chief Judge Desmond entered a blistering dis-
sent 3 arguing that the signing of routine bank forms was nei-
ther an express nor an implied severence of the community
interests. New York law was held applicable, however, al-
though the parties never moved to New York, did not specifi-
cally contract with each other, and the law of the community
" During the lifetime of Mrs. Packwood she could not be considered as
having any right in or title to the sugar. . . although it may have been the
fruit of property destined to be divided, as belonging to the community, upon
its dissolution. It wad sold before her death [and the proceeds put in a bank
account in New York in husband Packwood's name]. It was therefore, the
property of Packwood in New York, the place of his domicile. The fund in
the bank cannot be identified with the sugar, even supposing the sugar
belonged to the community, and the succession of Mrs. Packwood was enti-
tled to one half. It no longer existed in kind; it could no longer be identified;
it has merged . . ..
Id. at 346.
, 211 N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965).
,2 Id. at 638, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 234 (1962).
,3 Id. at 640, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 238 (1965).
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property domicile, Spain, prohibited them from entering into
a severance agreement. 4 The better solution in this case and
in Succession of Packwood would have been to find that no
severance in community interests occurs except where ex-
pressly agreed by the spouses. It is hoped that the Kentucky
courts will reach this solution.
While these interpretive questions may pose some prob-
lems until resolved by the courts, the Uniform Disposition of
Community Property Rights at Death Act is easily understood
and beneficial to everyone involved: the parties are certain of
their property interests and the attorney can supply dependa-
ble estate planning advice.1
5
Sarah N. Welling
' From RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLIcr OF LAWS § 258, Comment 3 (1971), cf.
this interpretation of exactly the same fact pattern.
H and W are domiciled in state X under whose local law spouses have
community property interests in each other's movables which they do not
have power to affect by an agreement with each other. H and W deposit cash
and securities in a joint account in a bank in state Y and sign a form agree-
ment prepared by the bank which provides that the Y rule of survivorship
shall apply. Under this rule, the entire interest in the cash and securities
would go to the surviving spouse upon the death of the other. Under X local
law, on the other hand, the estate of the deceased spouse would be entitled
to a one-half interest in the cash and securities. H dies and W has the cash
and securities moved from Y to state Z for safekeeping. In an action brought
in Z against W by H's executor, a Z court is asked to determine the respective
interests in the cash and securities of W and H's estate. The first question
for the Z court to determine is whether the interests of both X and Y would
be furthered by the application of thier respective local law rules. This is a
question that can only be determined in the light of the respective purposes
of these rules. One purpose of the X rule is surely to regulate the marital
property interests of X domiciliaries. Hence the interests of X would be
furthered by the application of the X rule. Since H and W were never domi-
ciled in Y, it is doubtful if Y's interests would be furthered by application of
the Y rule. Y's interests would be furthered if one purpose of the Y rule was
to make definite the consequences of dealing with Y banks. Even if the Y
rule had such a purpose, it would seem reasonably clear that X has the
greater interest in the application of its rule. The Z court should next deter-
mine if H and W really intended when they signed the form agreement with
the Y bank to have Y local law govern their interests in the cash and securi-
ties. If H and W did not intend such a result, the Z court should determine
the issue by application of X local law. If, on the other hand, H and W did
wish to have Y local law applied, the Z court must determine whether the
value of protecting the justified expectations of H and W is outweighed in
the particular case by the intensity of X's interest in having its rule applied.
Id. Obviously, the Restatement drafters disagreed with the result reached in Wyatt v.
Fulrath.
,1 Interview with Lay.
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